Matt Yglesias wonders “if one of these days we could have a real technical expert run DOT rather than a politician.” David Gunn, former head of Amtrak, has made the same complaint. I’m obviously sympathetic, but it is the right idea for the wrong position. What I mean by that is that much of the technical dysfunction falls under the FRA.
It was on this date four years ago that the Senate confirmed Joe Szabo to head the FRA. And whereas Obama’s second term will be getting a lot of new blood, that does not appear to be the case with the FRA. The country will apparently be stuck with Szabo, which is not a good thing for advocates of intercity and high-speed rail.
His record over the past four years is dreadful. The FRA has budgeted over $12 billion on projects, without accomplishing even one mile of HSR line. And despite many promises, the onerous FRA regulations have, if anything, gotten even worse. The PTC mandate is behind schedule, and his FRA funded the idiotic Caltrain CBOSS project. The next two years will be critical — do we really want the guy who tried to paint the letter “F” on locomotives?
When Amtrak planned the Acela back in the 1990s, one of the design goals was to use an off-the-shelf trainset. That would avoid years of debugging and extra costs involved with designing a new train. Of course, it didn’t work out that way — thanks to the FRA. The FRA created so many special rules, that Amtrak had no choice but to build a custom train.
And has the FRA learned anything from that fiasco? You would have thought so, based on the joint press conference held by the FRA, Amtrak, and the CHSRA. The key message was that this time Acela-2 would be an off-the-shelf design, and that the FRA would do everything possible to help Amtrak achieve that goal.
Unfortunately, it does not appear that FRA staffers got the memo:
FRA believes that future high-speed operations will in comparison save on bids because of the increased number of trainsets and carbuilders that will meet the final rule’s standards with little or no modification compared to the number that would have met the prior rule’s standards with little or no modification.
FRA notes that, in commenting on the economic analysis for the NPRM, which attempted to quantify the benefits of the rule changes, Amtrak stated:
The assumption that the standards simplify the design process of the equipment and would save $2,000,000 per train set is false. The Acela example indicates the exact opposite to be true. The FRA rules, as existing and proposed, eliminate the possibility of purchasing off-the-shelf equipment. The engineering work required to design new compliant equipment alone would far outstrip any possible savings from the rules if there were any to be had.
FRA believes that the former rule would not have permitted many, and perhaps might not have permitted any, carbuilders to offer off-the-shelf equipment with little or no modification that would have met the acceleration requirements on track with geometry having the maximum allowable deviations. Under the final rule it is likely that several carbuilders could provide off-the-shelf equipment that will meet acceleration requirements on minimally compliant track. This will lower costs through increased competition, and use of existing designs. Further, railroads may now be able to order equipment without tilting mechanisms and operate that equipment at high cant deficiencies, thus saving the costs of tilting mechanisms and making the number of available trainsets even greater. Based on the above, FRA does not agree with Amtrak’s comment for the purposes of this final rule. It is not unreasonable to estimate that the equipment procurement benefits alone will justify the costs of the rule. However, even if FRA eliminates from consideration equipment procurement benefits, as a result of Amtrak’s comment, FRA believes the high cant deficiency and streamlined testing requirements would justify the costs of the rule.
This is mind boggling. Despite HSR being a top priority of the President, the FRA is still creating roadblocks. You really get the idea that FRA bureaucrats are living under a rock. The ultimate responsibility, though, is FRA Administrator Joe Szabo. I’ll have more to say about him in a follow-up posting.
The next step is for us along with our contractors, Veolia and Bombardier, to determine the proper procedure for the installation of the new 100g split disc rotors. Together we will take all safety factors into consideration. Once all parties approve this process, we will begin the installation of the new rotors onto the Sprinter test vehicle. FRA and CPUC officials will observe the installation. We have invited representatives from Siemens (the Sprinter manufacturer) and certified California engineers to observe the installation and the testing and to review the data.
This really gives an idea of how over-regulated passenger rail has become. Representatives from two government agencies are supervising, plus the various contractors and other “invited” guests.
And here is a photo of the test-run. Note how they are paying a flagman to stand around holding a Stop sign — in addition to the perfectly operating crossing gates. Can’t be too careful!
Sunday’s test, in which one train ran between Escondido and San Marcos, was the first in what’s expected to be a weeks- or months-long overall evaluation period. ”Everything went great” Sunday, transit district spokeswoman Frances Schnall said Monday. “Everyone was really pleased with how things went.”
The train reached speeds of up to 50 mph, she said. State law imposes a 55 mph speed limit on the train.
Due to delays and defects, Boston MBTA may have to cancel a railcar order with Hyundai Rotem. The root causes are no surprise:
Hyundai Rotem made a bold entrance into the US market a decade ago with attractive promises, well-placed connections, and prices that beat experienced competitors.
Some in the industry considered it a risky bet, given that Hyundai Rotem had yet to open an assembly plant on American soil, a requirement under federal law, or demonstrate experience negotiating the stricter safety standards and other requirements that have bedeviled several large international corporations trying to break into the US transit and passenger rail market.
“North America is the most difficult market. It is the graveyard of car builders,” said Jonathan Klein, a global transportation consultant and former executive and chief mechanical officer at multiple large rail and transit agencies.
This could set a bad precedent. An FRA train horn tax does not encourage people to live near rail lines:
The city of Vancouver is asking residents of its east end if they support paying to silence train horns in their neighborhood.
City officials, working with neighborhood leaders, floated the proposal as a way to pay for the required railroad crossing improvements that come with a “quiet zone.” It would create a Local Improvement District, in which each household would pay based on how close it sits to the railroad crossings between Southeast 139th Avenue and Southeast 164th Avenue.
The proposed district includes 467 properties in the East Old Evergreen Highway neighborhood, between the Columbia River and state Highway 14. Households would contribute based on a three-tiered system. Tier 1 homes — those closest to the tracks — would pay $177 per year; Tier 2 homes would pay $124 per year; and Tier 3 homes would chip in $53 annually for 20 years.
The “Train Horn Rule” is a Federal unfunded mandate passed in 2005 by the FRA. It requires railroad operators to blast 96dB train horns at crossings — even where there are signals and crossing gates. Local communities along the tracks either have to put up with the ear-splitting noise, or else pay millions of dollars for dubious “Quiet-Zone” improvements. The rule has created a lot of frustration for communities that want to promote economic development around downtown railway stations:
As Fort Collins considers spending millions of dollars to silence freight trains on the Mason Corridor, elected federal officials are pleading with regulators to help end a “nuisance” they say keeps residents awake and stifles economic development. About 15 trains run daily along the city’s Mason Corridor, each blowing its horn for at least 15 seconds before entering crossings at intersections with streets such as Prospect, Mulberry and Mountain.
Federal Railroad Administration regulations require those train horns, and there are two ways to silence them: spend millions to install “quiet zones” with special crossing gates, or change federal regulations entirely. So while Fort Collins considers whether it should spend the money, U.S. Sens. Michael Bennet and Mark Udall, both Colorado Democrats, are asking regulators to reconsider the rules.
“City leaders across the state have told us how train horns stifle business and development in downtown areas and that they’ve run into challenges trying to meet regulations on quiet zones,” Bennet said in a statement issued Thursday. “We’re working to bring their voices to Washington and asking the FRA to take another look at these rules. Ideally, they’ll be more responsive to the needs of communities and we’ll have less bureaucratic red tape.”
Colorado Senators Bennet and Udall have sent a letter to FRA Administrator Joseph Szabo. Here is a copy of that letter:
January 23, 2013
Dear Administrator Szabo:
We write to request that the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) reopen the rulemaking process on the Final Rule on the Use of Locomotive Horns at Highway-Rail Grade Crossings (hereafter the “Train Horn Rule”). This would give the affected communities the chance to provide further input on the rule’s impact, while continuing to ensure the safety of their residents.
As you know, the Train Horn Rule was published in 2005 and was designed to promote safety while providing flexibility to communities negatively impacted by the requirement that trains sound their horns at certain times and decibel levels when traveling through municipalities. The 2005 rule allowed municipalities to apply to be a part of so-called “quiet zones” where they could be exempted from train horn sounding requirements when certain conditions were met.
Municipal leaders from Fort Collins, Loveland, Longmont, Greeley and Windsor, Colorado have expressed concerns to our offices that the train horn noise is a nuisance for local residents and that it stifles economic development by discouraging businesses and housing developers from building and locating in the heart of their communities. As you may expect, train horn noise impacts almost everyone in communities where the railroad runs right through the center of town and where the business and residential area is spread over a relatively small area. These impacts are amplified in downtown areas, which are focusing on redevelopment and urban renewal, as well as on creating healthy, walkable neighborhoods.
Although the underlying rule provides a quiet zone exemption, the communities listed above have indicated that the complexity of analyzing each different crossing and the costs associated with qualifying for an exemption are prohibitive for many municipalities in the state impacted by the rule.
While we strongly support the Train Horn Rule’s goal of reducing accidents at highway-rail grade crossings, we are concerned that it may prevent certain municipalities from being able to create quiet zones without incurring prohibitive costs. A more flexible rule could enable these communities to craft a solution that ensures safety yet also reduces noise and promotes long-term economic growth.
The Office of Management and Budget recently invited comment on the rule regarding how information and data relevant to the rule’s implementation is collected, with the goal of streamlining the process of collecting information from affected communities.
While this is an encouraging step, we believe the rule itself should allow for additional flexibility. It is therefore our hope that the FRA will consider re-opening the rule in order to consider further changes.
Thank you in advance for your consideration.
TGV passing through level crossing — without sounding the horn.
In case you missed it, here is video of the Amtrak Press Conference — where it was announced that California will be buying Acela-2 trainsets.
And if you were wondering how (or why?) a single trainset may be designed for both the NEC and CHSRA, you can listen as John Boardman explains that it is simply a matter of switching the trucks…or um, something.
And if you were wondering how this will reduce costs for California, you can listen as Jeff Morales explains that Buy-America policies, and a proprietary FRA spec will increase their buying power…or um, something.
Actually, the entire video is a huge embarrassment to the profession. I suggest having a lot of stiff drinks to make it through all the cringe-worthy moments.
Institutional dysfunction at the FRA and the DOT isn’t exactly a sexy topic for the mainstream press. So kudos to Stephen Smith for publishing a great article in Bloomberg that asks whether the next DOT Secretary can be a technical leader:
David Gunn, the president of Amtrak from 2002 to 2005, cited a lack of technical knowledge as the biggest problem at the Transportation Department, which he said has devolved into “an agency that just distributes money.”
“If you look at the Federal Railroad Administration and the Department of Transportation, they’ve never really had professional leadership,” argued Gunn.
Back in the 1990′s, Talgo made a major bet on the moribund US railcar market. It seemed like a good idea. Their trains were so far beyond Amtrak’s antiquated rolling stock, that the company should have really made a killing.
Things looked promising when they won a contract for the Amtrak Cascades service. But then the FRA found out about WDOT plans to use modern, light-weight European railcars.
The FRA would only grant approval for the service if a second deadweight locomotive was hitched to the back of the train (for “safety” reasons). And concrete blocks would have to be placed inside the locomotive.
When the national rail regulator is loading down your train with concrete blocks and a locomotive, it is not a positive sign that companies can expect a fair and open market. Things went downhill from there. Wisconsin Governor Walker reneged on a train order for the Hiawatha line. Then the final straw:
In an effort to jump-start the domestic passenger rail industry and create an extensive supplier base — a process Talgo had already begun — the FRA decided that California would lead a joint procurement of bilevel equipment on behalf of four Midwestern states (Iowa, Illinois, Michigan, and Missouri). This was necessary, the FRA believed, to entice bidders with a big enough order to take on the engineering and manufacturing challenges of producing a brand-new design with stringent “Buy America” provisions.
Standardized specifications were dictated by the Next Generation Corridor Equipment Pool Committee, a group comprised of representatives from states, manufacturers, and Amtrak authorized by Section 305 of the Passenger Rail investment and Improvement Act of 2008. Although the committee had issued a single-level equipment performance spec as well, FRA staffers made it quite clear to Midwestern state rail planners that they were expected to be a part of the California-led bilevel request for proposals.
Because the request for proposals is equipment-specific, Talgo’s single-level product has thus far been shut out of Midwest lines now being upgraded for 110-mph top speeds, such as the Chicago-Detroit-Pontiac, Mich., Wolverine corridor. That route’s twist and turns would be a perfect fit for Wisconsin’s would-be orphans.
This decision wasn’t good for California either. California’s twisty routes would also have benefited from a Talgo tilt-train. And whereas the Talgo factory was up and ready to go, it will take years for FRA to design their new railcar and get it into production. In the meantime, California suffers shortages of railcars, and has even refurbished old 1960′s railcars as a stop-gap measure.
U.S. demand for transit rail cars is limited and erratic and orders tend to be for customized cars. Transit rail cars in the U.S. comprise about 5 percent of the worldwide fleet. Transit agencies’ purchases vary considerably over time: A large transit agency may replace its entire fleet in 1 year, contributing to a spike in the market, whereas in other years, there may be only a fraction of that demand for the U.S. market. Transit agencies often request custom car designs to address not only legacy infrastructure requirements and interoperability issues with existing fleets, but also preferences. Rail car orders of small size and demand for customized cars can increase the price per car by, for example, concentrating design costs among fewer cars.
The federal government provides some funding for transit rail cars and has varying levels of involvement in setting design standards for transit rail cars. More than half of the transit agencies GAO interviewed purchased rail cars with some type of federal funding, such as formula or discretionary capital funds. When transit agencies use federal funds to purchase rail cars, certain requirements apply, such as “Buy America”—which requires, among other things, that rail cars be assembled in the United States.
Unfortunately, the study is a disappointment as the GAO fails to connect the dots. They don’t make the connection between “Buy-America” and the cost blowouts. Nor does the GAO investigate why transit agencies are hiring consultants to design boutique trains (and no, it isn’t a problem of legacy infrastructure).
And then there is the FRA-compliant nonsense. Getting rid of the FRA buff-strength rules would solve a lot of problems, but here the GAO doubles down:
FRA enlisted APTA’s assistance to help develop safety standards for commuter rail cars and then expanded the effort to establish industry standards and recommended practices for commuter rail car safety. According to FRA and APTA officials, his has led to greater uniformity in the design and production of commuter rail cars. This greater uniformity could alleviate some of the market difficulties that we previously discussed resulting from customized designs.
Of course, we now know that this FRA “standardized” design had the opposite effect. For example, Amtrak’s latest order for 130 new bi-level railcars came with an absurd price tag.
So how did the GAO get it so wrong? Well, it is clear that the GAO only consulted with domestic manufacturers, and the APTA union — i.e. rent seekers who benefit from the existing regulatory framework. Or perhaps the GAO wasn’t really interested in solving the problem. In any case, transit advocates really need to have input on these GAO audits.
